Watermark extraction and content screening in a networked environment

ABSTRACT

Methods, devices, and computer program products facilitate the application of a content use policy based on watermarks that are embedded in a content. Watermark extraction and content screening operations, which can include the application of content usage enforcement actions, may be organized such that some or all of the operations can be conducted at different times by different devices. The watermark extraction results can be stored in a secure location and accessed by other devices at different times. These operations can be conducted by one or more trusted devices that reside in a home network. The home network can also include a gateway device that can coordinate the operations of the various network devices and/or delegate the various watermark extraction and content screening operations.

RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application claims priority from U.S. provisional application No.61/383,693 filed on Sep. 16, 2010, which is incorporated herein byreference in its entirety for all purposes.

FIELD OF INVENTION

The present invention generally relates to the field of contentmanagement. More particularly, the disclosed embodiments relate toefficient and secure extraction of watermarks from media content toenable content management.

BACKGROUND

This section is intended to provide a background or context to thedisclosed embodiments that are recited in the claims. The descriptionherein may include concepts that could be pursued, but are notnecessarily ones that have been previously conceived or pursued.Therefore, unless otherwise indicated herein, what is described in thissection is not prior art to the description and claims in thisapplication and is not admitted to be prior art by inclusion in thissection.

Digital watermarks have been proposed and used for copyright protectionof signals such as audio, video, images and the like. In a typicalwatermarking scenario an auxiliary information signal is hidden within ahost content in such a way that it is substantially imperceptible, andat the same time, difficult to remove without damaging the host content.The auxiliary information that is hidden within the host content canthen allow content management to be carried out to varying degrees. Insome embodiments, content management includes, but is not limited to,the management of the use of content in accordance with one or morepolicies. For example, the auxiliary information may merely convey thatthe host content is not allowed to be copied (i.e., a “no copy allowed”watermark). Once extracted and interpreted by a compliant device,copying of the content is prevented. A compliant device can include, butis not limited to, a device that performs screening, or otherwiseoperates in a manner consistent with a content use policy. Content use(or the uses of content) can include, but is not limited to, operationsinvolving content such as playback, copy, record, transfer, stream, orother operations. Additionally, or alternatively, the embedded auxiliaryinformation can identify the rightful owner(s), author(s) and/orauthor(s) of the content or can provide a serial number associated withthe content or other content identifying information. The auxiliaryinformation can also be used for other applications, such as to monitorthe usage of the embedded host content, resolve ownership disputes, andkeep track of royalties and the like.

In order to extract and utilize the watermarks embedded in variouscontent, substantial resources such as CPU cycles, digital memory, andcommunication resources may be engaged. This, in turn, can delay accessto the content, increase the cost of manufacturing devices that aredesigned with a minimum processing load objective, increase batteryconsumption in mobile devices, etc. The processing burden associatedwith extracting such watermarks is often exacerbated by a need toperform certain additional content transformation operations, such asdecryption, decompression, de-multiplexing, etc., that are must beperformed before watermark extraction can be attempted.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

This section is intended to provide a summary of certain exemplaryembodiments and is not intended to limit the scope of the embodimentsthat are disclosed in this application.

The disclosed embodiments improve the efficiency of watermark extractionand the associated processing by reducing the overall resourceengagement, utilizing spare resources whenever possible, anddistributing resource engagement in time to achieve low peakrequirements and optimize cost-performance tradeoff. These and otherfeatures of the disclosed embodiments are effected while maintainingappropriate levels of security associated with the usage of watermarks.The disclosed embodiments further enhance the capabilities of connected(e.g., networked) devices to effect watermark extraction, contentscreening and content management through cooperative efforts. Watermarkextraction and content screening operations, which can include theapplication of content usage enforcement actions, may be organized suchthat some or all of the operations can be conducted at different timesby different devices. Further, the watermark extraction results can bestored in a secure location and accessed by other devices at differenttimes.

One aspect of the disclosed embodiments relates to a method thatincludes receiving a request for access to a content at a first devicefrom a second device, where the first device operates in a network. Thismethod further comprises performing device authentication to ascertain atrusted status associated with one or both of the first and seconddevices, and determining an operational configuration for performingwatermark extraction and/or screening operations using of one or moretrusted devices. In one embodiment, the second device is a trustedcontent client device, and the second device is configured to performthe watermark extraction and screening operations.

In another embodiment, the second device is also a trusted contentclient device. But in this embodiment, a trusted slave device isconfigured to perform the watermark extraction operation and provideinformation associated with the extraction information to the seconddevice. Moreover, the second device is configured to perform thescreening operation. In still another embodiment, where the seconddevice is a trusted content client device, a trusted delegated device isconfigured to perform the watermark extraction and screening operations.

According to another embodiment, the first device is a trusted contentserver, and the first device is configured to perform the watermarkextraction and screening operations. In another embodiment, the firstdevice is similarly a trusted content server. However, in thisembodiment, a trusted slave device is configured to perform thewatermark extraction operation and provide information associated withthe extraction information to the first device. Further, the firstdevice is configured to perform the screening operation.

In another embodiment, where the first device is a trusted contentserver, a trusted delegated device is configured to perform thewatermark extraction and screening operations. In yet anotherembodiment, the first device is a trusted content server and the seconddevice is a trusted content client device. According to this embodiment,the first device is configured to perform the watermark extractionoperation and the second device is configured to perform the screeningoperation.

In another embodiment, where the first device is a trusted contentserver and the second device is a trusted content client device, thesecond device is configured to perform the watermark extractionoperation. In this embodiment, the first device is configured to performthe screening operation.

According to one embodiment, the network in the above described methodis a home network. For example, such a home network can be a digitalliving network alliance (DLNA) network. While in another embodiment, thesecond device also operates in the network, in another embodiment, thesecond device operates outside of the network.

According to one embodiment, the first device is a non-compliant deviceand the second device is a compliant device. In another embodiment, thefirst device is a compliant device but the second device is anon-compliant device. In still another embodiment, both the first andthe second devices are non-compliant devices.

Another aspect of the disclosed embodiments relates to a device thatincludes a processor and a memory, including processor executable code.The processor executable code when executed by the processor configuresthe device to receive a request for access to a content at a firstdevice from a second device, where the first device operates in anetwork. The processor executable code when executed by the processoralso configures the device to perform device authentication to ascertaina trusted status associated with one or both of the first and the seconddevices. The processor executable code when executed by the processorfurther configures the device to determine an operational configurationfor performing watermark extraction and/or screening operations usingone or more trusted devices.

Another aspect of the disclosed embodiments relates to a computerprogram product that is embodied on a non-transitory computer readablemedium. The computer program product comprises program code forreceiving a request for access to a content at a first device from asecond device, the first device operating in a network. The computerprogram product also includes program code for performing deviceauthentication to ascertain a trusted status associated with one or bothof the first and the second devices. The computer program productfurther includes program code for determining an operationalconfiguration for performing watermark extraction and/or screeningoperations using one or more trusted devices.

Another aspect of the disclosed embodiments relates to a device thatcomprises means for receiving a request for access to a content at afirst device from a second device, the first device operating in anetwork and means for performing device authentication to ascertain atrusted status associated with one or both of the first and the seconddevices. Such a device further includes means for determining anoperational configuration for performing watermark extraction and/orscreening operations using one or more trusted devices.

Another aspect of the disclosed embodiments relates to a method thatcomprises receiving a request for access to a content at a gatewaydevice configured to coordinate operations of a plurality of deviceswithin a network. Such a request is received from a second device foraccess to the content that is accessible to the first device, where thefirst device is configured to operate within the network. Such a methodfurther includes coordinating, at the gateway device, deviceauthentication to ascertain a trusted status associated with one or bothof the first and second devices, and determining, at the gateway device,an operational configuration for performing watermark extraction andcontent screening operations using of one or more trusted devices.

In one embodiment, the second device is a device that is configured tooperate within the network, while in another embodiment, with the seconddevice is a device that is configured to operate outside of the network.In another embodiment, the gateway device is configured to communicatewith the one or more trusted devices to commence the watermarkextraction and/or screening operations. In another example, the gatewaydevice is configured to revoke a trusted status of a device within thenetwork. In still other examples, the gateway device is configured toretain a content use policy associated with embedded watermarks. In onevariation, the gateway device is also configured to communicate thecontent use policy to various trusted devices.

Another aspect of the disclosed embodiments relates to a gateway devicethat comprises a processor, and a memory, comprising processorexecutable code. The processor executable code when executed by theprocessor configures the gateway device to receive a request for accessto a content at the gateway device that is configured to coordinateoperations of a plurality of devices within a network. The request isreceived from a second device for access to the content that isaccessible to the first device, where the first device is configured tooperate within the network. The processor executable code when executedby the processor further configures the gateway device to coordinatedevice authentication to ascertain a trusted status associated with oneor both of the first and second devices. The processor executable codewhen executed by the processor also configures the gateway device todetermine an operational configuration for performing watermarkextraction and content screening operations using of one or more trusteddevices.

Another aspect of the disclosed embodiments relates to a computerprogram product, embodied on a non-transitory computer readable medium,that comprises computer code for receiving a request for access to acontent at the gateway device that is configured to coordinateoperations of a plurality of devices within a network. The request isreceived from a second device for access to the content that isaccessible to the first device, where the first device is configured tooperate within the network. The computer program product also comprisescomputer code for coordinating device authentication to ascertain atrusted status associated with one or both of the first and seconddevices, and computer code for determining an operational configurationfor performing watermark extraction and content screening operationsusing of one or more trusted devices.

Another aspect of the disclosed embodiments relates to a device thatcomprises means for transmitting a request for access to a content froma second device to a first device, the first device operating in anetwork. This device also includes means for performing deviceauthentication to ascertain a trusted status associated with the firstdevice, and means for determining an operational configuration forperforming watermark extraction and/or screening operations using one ormore trusted devices.

Another aspect of the disclosed embodiments relates to a method thatincludes transmitting a request for access to a content from a seconddevice to a first device, where the first device operating in a network.This method also includes performing device authentication to ascertaina trusted status associated with the first device, and determining anoperational configuration for performing watermark extraction and/orscreening operations using one or more trusted devices.

Another aspect of the disclosed embodiments relates to a device thatcomprises a processor and a memory, including processor executable code.The processor executable code when executed by the processor configuresthe device to transmit a request for access to a content from a seconddevice to a first device, the first device operating in a network, andto perform device authentication to ascertain a trusted statusassociated with the first device. The processor executable code whenexecuted by the processor further configures the device to determine anoperational configuration for performing watermark extraction and/orscreening operations using one or more trusted devices.

Another aspect of the disclosed embodiments relates to a computerprogram product that is embodied on a non-transitory computer readablemedium. The computer program product includes program code fortransmitting a request for access to a content from a second device to afirst device, where the first device operates in a network. The computerprogram product also includes program code for performing deviceauthentication to ascertain a trusted status associated with the firstand device, and program code for determining an operationalconfiguration for performing watermark extraction and/or screeningoperations using one or more trusted devices.

An aspect of the disclosed embodiments relates to a method thatcomprises receiving a device authentication certificate at a firstdevice from a second device and verifying an authenticity of thecertificate. This method also includes ascertaining capabilities of thesecond device and determining an operational configuration forconducting watermark extraction and/or screening operations associatedwith a content. In one embodiment, the certificate contains informationindicative of at least a portion of the capabilities of the seconddevice. In one example, the certificate is a digital transmissioncontent protection over Internet protocol (DTCP-IP) certificate, and theinformation regarding the capabilities of the second device is carriedas part of that DCTP-IP certificate. In another embodiment, at least aportion of the capabilities of the second device is ascertained from asource other than the certificate. For example, at least a portion ofthe capabilities of the second device can be received through anadditional communication with the second device.

According to another embodiment, the ascertained capabilities of thesecond device includes a capability to conduct some or all of thewatermark extraction operation and/or the content screening operation.In such a scenario, the operational configuration can designate thesecond device to perform at least one of the watermark extraction andscreening operations. In another embodiment, the ascertainedcapabilities of the second device include a capability to grantcomputational and memory resources to other devices.

In one embodiment, the above-noted method further includes receiving adevice authentication certificate at the second device from the firstdevice, verifying the authenticity of the certificate received from thefirst device and ascertaining capabilities of the first device. In onevariation, the certificate that is received from the first devicecontains information indicative of at least a portion of thecapabilities of the first device. In one example, the certificate thatis received from the first device is a digital transmission contentprotection over Internet protocol (DTCP-IP) certificate and theinformation regarding the capabilities of the first device is carried aspart of that DCTP-IP certificate. In another example, at least a portionof the capabilities of the first device is ascertained from a sourceother than the certificate. For instance, at least a portion of thecapabilities of the first device can be received through an additionalcommunication with the first device. In another embodiment, theascertained capabilities of the first device comprise a capability toconduct some or all of the watermark extraction and/or content screeningoperations.

In one embodiment, the ascertained capabilities of the first devicecomprise a capability to grant computational and memory resources toother devices. In one variation, the determination of the operationalconfiguration for conducting watermark extraction and/or screeningoperations is conducted in accordance with the ascertained capabilitiesof the first device and the second device. In another embodiment, theoperational configuration designates the first device to perform atleast one of the watermark extraction operation and the screeningoperation. In still another embodiment, the operational configurationdesignates the first and the second devices to collaboratively performthe watermark extraction operation and the content screening operation.

According to another embodiment, the operational configurationdesignates at least one of the first and the second devices to conductwatermark extraction and content screening operations in accordance witha factor selected from the group consisting of: availability ofcomputational resources, availability of watermark extraction andscreening capabilities, integration complexity for a devicemanufacturer, consumer experience, processing performance, and anoverall preference ranking. In one embodiment, at least one of the firstand second devices are configured to operate in a home network. Forexample, such a home network can be a digital living network alliance(DLNA) network.

Another aspect of the disclosed embodiments relates to a device thatincludes a processor and a memory, including processor executable codeThe processor executable code when executed by the processor configuresthe device to receive a device authentication certificate at a firstdevice from a second device and verify an authenticity of thecertificate. The processor executable code when executed by theprocessor also configures the device to ascertain the capabilities ofthe second device and determine an operational configuration forconducting watermark extraction and/or screening operations associatedwith a content.

Another aspect of the disclosed embodiments relates to a computerprogram product that is embodied on a non-transitory computer readablemedium. The computer program product comprises program code forreceiving a device authentication certificate at a first device from asecond device and program code for verifying an authenticity of thecertificate. The computer program product also includes program code forascertaining capabilities of the second device and program code fordetermining an operational configuration for conducting watermarkextraction and/or screening operations associated with a content.

Another aspect of the disclosed embodiments relates to a device thatcomprises means for receiving a device authentication certificate at afirst device from a second device and means for verifying anauthenticity of the certificate. The device also includes means forascertaining capabilities of the second device and means for determiningan operational configuration for conducting watermark extraction and/orscreening operations associated with a content.

Another aspect of the disclosed embodiments relates to a method thatincludes retrieving an existing watermark extraction record associatedwith a content in response to detection of an operation in a contenthandling device, where the operation requires access to a content. Themethod also comprises authenticating the content in accordance with theexisting watermark extraction record and effecting content screening inaccordance with a content use policy associated with the content. In oneembodiment, the operation that requires access to the content can be atleast one of: a copying operation, a transferring operation, a renderingoperation, a playback operation and a recording operation.

In one embodiment, the existing watermark extraction record is retrievedfrom a location outside of the content handling device. In anotherembodiment such a location is at least one of: a private virtual lockeron a cloud, a universal virtual locker on a cloud, a storage on a devicethat is compliant to DLNA (Digital Living Network Alliance) within ahome network, a storage location within a digital living networkalliance (DLNA) compliant network, a storage location within anotherdevice that is communicatively connected to the content handling deviceand a removable computer-readable storage medium. In another embodiment,the existing watermark extraction record is retrieved from the contenthandling device.

In another embodiment, the existing watermark extraction recordcomprises at least one of: an extracted watermark payload, a number ofextracted watermarks, a time stamp associated with an extractedwatermark payload, a content authentication information, a digitalsignature associated with the extraction record, a content use policyassociated with the content, and an enforcement action associated with acontent use policy and an extracted watermark payload.

In still another embodiment, at least one of the retrieval of theexisting watermark extraction record and authentication of the contentfile fails, and the content is subjected to a new watermark extractionoperation. In such an embodiment, the method can further includeproducing a new watermark extraction record. In such an embodiment, acontent use policy can prescribe an enforcement action in accordancewith a result of the new watermark extraction operation. For example,the prescribed enforcement action can be stored as part of the newwatermark extraction record. In another embodiment, the content usepolicy prescribes an enforcement action in accordance with the existingwatermark extraction record.

According to another embodiment, the content screening comprises atleast one of: muting at least a portion of the content, blanking atleast a portion of the content, displaying a copyright notice, denyingaccess to the content, deleting the content, recording the content usagein the content handling device, sending content usage information to aremote server, playback or display of at least an advertisement storedlocally or transmitted from a remote server, playback or display of areduced resolution of the content, contacting a remote server forpermission to access the content, and/or fulfilling a paymenttransaction with a remote server. In yet another embodiment, the contenthandling device is digital living network alliance (DLNA) compliantdevice.

In one embodiment, the operation that requires access to the contentrequires real-time access to the content. In this embodiment, theexisting watermark extraction record comprises a segmentedauthentication information corresponding to a plurality of contentsegments, and the authentication is carried out for at least a segmentof the content in accordance with the segmented authenticationinformation. In such a scenario, the existing extraction information canaccompany a streaming content. In one example, the segmentedauthentication information comprises a segmented hash value. In anotherexample, the authentication is carried out for sequential segments ofthe content, while in a different example, the authentication is carriedout for non-sequential segments of the content.

In one embodiment, the screening is effected by evaluating theinformation contained within the existing watermark extraction record inconjunction with content use information associated with a predeterminedtime period. For example, the content use information can comprise anextracted watermark payload and an associated time stamp within a timeinterval immediately preceding the time when the operation is detected.

According to another embodiment, the operation that requires contentaccess in the content handling device requires access to a plurality ofcontents, where one or more of the plurality of the contents have a sizebelow a particular threshold. In this scenario, the content screening iseffected by first concatenating the plurality of the contents with asize below the particular threshold and conducting a new watermarkextraction operation on the concatenated content. The content screeningis further effected by aggregating the results associated with the newwatermark extraction operation and the information obtained from theexisting watermark extraction record that correspond to one or more ofthe plurality of the contents with a size above or equal to theparticular threshold. These operations are followed by producing anenforcement action in accordance the aggregated results.

Another aspect of the disclosed embodiments relates to a device thatcomprises a processor and a memory that includes processor executablecode. The processor executable code when executed by the processorconfigures the device to retrieve an existing watermark extractionrecord associated with a content in response to detection of anoperation in a content handling device, where the operation requiresaccess to a content. The processor executable code when executed by theprocessor also configures the device to authenticate the content inaccordance with the existing watermark extraction record and effectcontent screening in accordance with a content use policy associatedwith the content.

Another aspect of the disclosed embodiments relates to a computerprogram product that is embodied on a non-transitory computer readablemedium. The computer program code comprises computer code for retrievingan existing watermark extraction record associated with a content inresponse to detection of an operation in a content handling device,where the operation requires access to a content. The computer programproduct further comprises computer code for authenticating the contentin accordance with the existing watermark extraction record, andcomputer code for effecting content screening in accordance with acontent use policy associated with the content.

Another aspect of the disclosed embodiments relates to a device thatcomprises means for retrieving an existing watermark extraction recordassociated with a content in response to detection of an operation in acontent handling device, where the operation requires access to acontent. The device also includes means for authenticating the contentin accordance with the existing watermark extraction record and meansfor effecting content screening in accordance with a content use policyassociated with the content.

These and other advantages and features of disclosed embodiments,together with the organization and manner of operation thereof, willbecome apparent from the following detailed description when taken inconjunction with the accompanying drawings.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The disclosed embodiments are described by referring to the attacheddrawings, in which:

FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a content handling device in accordancewith an example embodiment;

FIG. 2 is a flow diagram of certain watermark extraction and contentscreening operations in accordance with an example embodiment;

FIG. 3 is a flow diagram of certain watermark extraction operations inaccordance with an example embodiment;

FIG. 4 illustrates a block diagram of a invocation model deviceconfiguration in accordance with an example embodiment;

FIG. 5 illustrates a block diagram of a delegation model deviceconfiguration in accordance with an example embodiment;

FIG. 6 illustrates a block diagram of a content server and contentclient device configuration in accordance with an example embodiment;

FIG. 7 illustrates an authentication procedure in accordance with anexample embodiment;

FIG. 8 illustrates collaborative watermark extraction and contentscreening operation in accordance with an example embodiment;

FIG. 9 illustrates a block diagram of a content distributionarchitecture in accordance with an example embodiment; and

FIG. 10 illustrates a block diagram of an exemplary device that canaccommodate the disclosed embodiments.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF CERTAIN EMBODIMENTS

In the following description, for purposes of explanation and notlimitation, details and descriptions are set forth in order to provide athorough understanding of the disclosed embodiments. However, it will beapparent to those skilled in the art that the present invention may bepracticed in other embodiments that depart from these details anddescriptions.

Additionally, in the subject description, the word “exemplary” is usedto mean serving as an example, instance, or illustration. Any embodimentor design described herein as “exemplary” is not necessarily to beconstrued as preferred or advantageous over other embodiments ordesigns. Rather, use of the word exemplary is intended to presentconcepts in a concrete manner.

Some of the disclosed embodiments are described in the context of aDigital Living Network Alliance (DLNA) compliant network. DLNA is across-industry organization of leading consumer electronics, computingindustry and mobile device companies. DLNA's vision is a wired andwireless network of interoperable consumer electronics (CE), personalcomputers (PC) and mobile devices in the home and on the road, enablinga seamless environment for sharing and growing new digital media andcontent services. DLNA is focused on delivering interoperabilityguidelines based on open industry standards to complete thecross-industry digital convergence.

In order for commercial digital content to be made available for usewith DLNA devices, content must be protected from unauthorized copyingand use. Digital rights management (DRM) technologies are widelyavailable and used to protect the commercial content and manage theusage rights associated with content acquired through different channels(cable, satellite, Internet, etc.) and models (VOD, DVD, rental, etc.).DRM, however, is outside of current DLNA, which leaves the option of DRMimplementation to the device manufacturer. Moreover, neither a list ofapproved DRM technologies nor DRM interoperability has been included inthe current version of DLNA.

Link Protection is the only content protection mechanism in DLNA, whichis an optional implementation for a DLNA-compliant device. The primaryuse case for Link Protection applies to a commercial content that isstored on a media server and protected by a DRM technology. LinkProtection provides that such a content can be decrypted andre-encrypted using a Link Protection technology by the media serverbefore being sent to a client device (such as a television). The clientdevice then decrypts the received content and renders/displays it. DLNALink Protection thus enables view-only sharing of commercial content onall devices in, for example, a home network. However, Link Protection isnot able to prevent pirated commercial content from being shared andconsumed in the home network. In fact, since a decrypted copy of thecontent is available within the home network. DLNA-enabled contentsharing can result in easier and wider sharing of pirated content.

The absence of an appropriate content protection in DLNA has been abarrier for commercial content to be made widely available inDLNA-compliant networks. The disclosed embodiments utilize watermarksthat are embedded within a host content to identify unauthorized orpirated content in a network, such as DLNA-compliant networks, and toenable the communication and enactment of use policies for contentacross a broad range of distribution channels and devices. In someembodiments, screening and/or content screening are used to refer tooperations that include, but are not limited to, examination of acontent by a device to determine whether a use conforms to a content usepolicy. The content use policy can, for example, include one or morerules governing the use of content, including, but not limited to, theconditions under which certain uses result in the taking of a specifiedaction. The content use policy can also contain rules that do notcontrol “usage” per se. For example, the content use policy can containrules that report on the use of the content to a network server, orpresent an advertisement to the user, or take other actions. It shouldbe also noted that the term extraction can refer to operations thatinclude, but are not limited to, examination of a content to determinethe presence of a watermark, and possible assessment of the auxiliarydata within the detected watermark. During extraction, the watermark istypically not removed from the content. However, the disclosedembodiments can also readily accommodate watermark extraction algorithmsthat remove the embedded watermarks during the extraction process.According to the disclosed embodiments, by way of various operations,such as the extraction of watermarks from a content, the assessment ofthe content use policy associated with the extracted watermarks and theapplication of appropriate enforcement actions, can be distributed amongone or more trusted entities. In some embodiments, such enforcementactions include, but are not limited to, the elements of a content usepolicy that relate to an operation or a function that is performed whena specified type of use occurs. As such, not all the devices within anetwork are required to possess the full range of watermark extractionand content screening capabilities in order to comply with a particularcontent management scheme. Further, the disclosed embodiments enable adevice to determine if another device is trustworthy, and to ascertainthe extent of watermark extraction and/or screening capabilities of thatdevice. It should be noted that while some of the disclosed embodimentsare described in the context of DLNA and DLNA-compliant devices andnetworks, the disclosed embodiments are equally applicable to otherprotocols, standards, networked environments and devices that areassociated with the production, transmission, discovery, storage,control and presentation of media content, such as movies, audio tracks,images and the like.

As noted earlier, watermarks can be used to protect audio oraudio-visual content from unauthorized uses. For example, movies thatare being released to theaters can be embedded with watermarks thatcarry a “No-Home-Use” (NHU) code, indicating that they are only to beduplicated by professional replicators and played back on professionalprojection equipment. In another example, content that is released onBlu-ray Disc, DVD, or by authorized download services, can be embeddedwith watermarks that carry a “Trusted Source” (TS) code, indicating thatsuch content is intended for consumer use, but with limitations thatthey must be protected by trusted DRM technologies. In another example,content can be embedded with watermarks carrying codes that uniquelyidentify the content, such as with an industry standard identificationcode such as the International Standard Audiovisual Number (ISAN),International Standard Recording Code (ISRC), Global Release Identifier(GRID), International Standard Book Number (ISBN), Universal ProductCode (UPC), or a value assigned from another numbering system, and forwhich a mechanism is provided to use the identification code to “lookup” more detailed descriptive information about the content and thepermissions (or “rights”) associated with its use, such as in a locallystored or online database. The embedded watermarks that are provided inaccordance with the disclosed embodiments can be embedded within theaudio, video and/or image portions of the content and are designed toremain with the content, wherever it appears, including after copying,conversion to different formats, capturing by a camcorder, and otherintentional and unintentional content manipulations. Content handlingdevices, such as Blu-ray Disc players, can detect the presence of theembedded watermarks and limit the use of the content when certainunauthorized uses are identified. For example, playback or copying ofunauthorized copies of the content may be stopped or an audio portion ofthe content may be muted, depending on which embedded code is extractedand what operation is being performed by the content handling device.

In some embodiments, significant improvements in watermark extractionefficiency are achieved by executing watermark extraction prior to theuse (e.g., playback, copying, transmission, display, etc.) of thecontent. In such embodiments, the watermark extraction operation issometimes referred to as “background” watermark extraction. A watermarkextraction operation that is conducted prior to the usage of a contentcan produce an extraction record for secure storage in order to reducethe need for real-time extraction on the same content at the time of afuture use. In some embodiments, a real-time extraction is performed oncontent at the time that content is being used. In some instances,watermark extraction can also be real-time extraction. As a result ofwatermark extraction (e.g., background watermark extraction) anextraction record can be created that includes, but is not limited to,information representing the results of a background extractionoperation in a form suitable for storage. Furthermore, it is understoodthat the term “background” in the context of the disclosed embodimentsis not intended to convey that the associated operations are necessarilyperformed through background processing within a multitasking operatingsystem. Rather, background extraction can be performed as part offoreground processing, background processing, or combinations thereof.In some embodiments, the content use may be delayed until the watermarkextraction process is at least partially completed. In yet otherembodiments, watermark extraction and content usage are interleaved intime so that watermark extraction is always ahead of content use. Instill other embodiments, watermark extraction may take place inreal-time, during, and in synchronization with, the transfer or theusage of the content.

According to the disclosed embodiments, the results of watermarkextraction are stored in a secure fashion so that they can be retrievedat a different time, such as at the start of content usage. In thiscontext, the watermark extraction is carried out by a watermarkextractor that can be configured to extract, process, decode and analyzethe embedded watermarks to discern the presence of watermarks and/or toobtain the payload value of the embedded watermarks. In someembodiments, the watermark extraction may further include discerningsome or all of the content use policy associated with the embeddedwatermarks. The extraction of watermarks is typically a passiveoperation that does not affect the integrity of the host content. Awatermark extractor, which may be implemented in software, hardwareand/or firmware, can be further configured to designate potentialenforcement actions that must be initiated based on the extractedwatermarks and in conformance with the associated content use policy. Inone example, where an unauthorized usage of the content is detectedthrough the assessment of embedded watermarks, the content may be purged(i.e., deleted). Alternatively, the content may be preserved and theuser may be informed of the content status at a convenient moment (e.g.at the start of a playback attempt). In other embodiments, the user maybe advised as to one or more recommended corrective actions, such aspurchasing a license that allows authorized playback of the content. Theabove scenarios only provide a few exemplary actions that may becommenced upon the extraction of one or more embedded watermarks.However, it is understood that additional actions may additionally, oralternatively, be effected. Furthermore, the content use policiesassociated with the embedded watermarks may include automaticmonitoring, logging and/or reporting the use of the particular content,associating the content with additional information (which may beaccessed over the internet), and associating the content user with otherusers of this or similar contents. It is understood that other actionsmay additionally, or alternatively, be effected.

In some embodiments, if the content has no embedded watermarks,information indicating the absence of an embedded watermark is stored(e.g., in an associated meta data file) for further use. For example, atthe moment of actual content usage, the stored information, indicativeof the absence of watermarks, can be used to allow content usage withouta need to undertake watermark extraction. In some embodiments, theextraction process may produce watermarks that are insufficient totrigger an enforcement action. For instance, enforcement rulesassociated with a trusted source (TS) watermark require the extractionof watermarks over an extended period of time before triggering anenforcement action. For example, an enforcement action logic for afeature movie may require finding the TS watermarks in at least 7 out of9 sequential 200-second screening intervals in order to trigger anenforcement action. On the other hand, for a short audio-visual content(e.g., shorter than one hour such as a TV show), an enforcement logicmay require finding the TS watermarks in at least 7 out of 9 sequential100-second screening intervals in order to trigger an enforcementaction. In some embodiments, such an enforcement logic includes, but isnot limited to, the elements of a content use policy that relate to thetypes of use of content that will result in a specified enforcementaction. To facilitate the operations of a content handling device inthese and other similar scenarios, upon the extraction of watermarksduring the watermark extraction, a list of extracted watermarks withassociated time stamps are stored for later use.

The stored information must be secured against manipulation in a secureway. In one example, digital signatures are used to ensure that thestored information is authentic and free of tampering. It is alsodesirable to ensure user privacy by preventing unauthorized thirdparties from accessing the stored information. This can be achieved byutilizing encryption techniques to protect the stored data fromunauthorized access. In particular, in DLNA, digital transmissioncontent protection over Internet protocol (DTCP-IP) is the mandatorytechnology when a device implements Link Protection. As such, allDTCP-IP compliant devices are assigned a unique device identificationcode and a device public/private key pair. In this scenario, the storedextraction information can be digitally signed by the private key of theDLNA-compliant device and encrypted using the public key of that device.In some embodiments, extraction information can include, but is notlimited to, information that is obtained from performing an extractionoperation. As a result, only that device can create new digitalsignatures and decrypt the stored extraction information, while anyonewith the associated public key can detect tampering attempts to thestored information.

FIG. 1 illustrates an exemplary content handling device 100 that may beused to accommodate the disclosed embodiments. The content handlingdevice may conduct one or more operations such as rendering, recording,copying, transferring and/or playback of an input content 102. The inputcontent 102 may be communicated to the content handling device 100through one or more communication channels comprising wired and/orwireless communication channels, magnetic, optical, Flash and/or othercomputer readable media, or other sources. As such, the content handlingdevice 100 can be configured to detect the presence of the input content102. The same or a different component within the content handlingdevice can detect a request for the input content 102 that is receivedfrom another entity. The detection of the input content 102 or thereception of a request for the input content 102 can be carried out by adetector/receiver component within the content handling device 100. Sucha detector/receiver component can be part of, or a separate componentfrom, the commutation component 110. In embodiments where the contenthandling device 100 is configured to request a content from anotherentity, a component such as a processor that is executing a programcode, within the content handling device 100 can generate such a requestfor the content and transmit the request to another device through, forexample, the communication component 110. In one example, the contenthandling device 100 is DLNA-compliant device, which may be incommunication with one or more other DLNA-compliant devices. The contenthandling device comprises a watermark extractor 104 that screens theinput content for the presence of watermarks. As noted earlier, thewatermark extractor 104 can extract, process, decode and/or analyze theembedded watermarks and to discern the content use policy associatedwith the embedded content. The content handling device can also includea digital signature generator 106, which can be configured to producedigital signatures in accordance with one or more algorithms.

Further, an encryption/decryption component 108 within the contenthandling device 100 can be configured to encrypt/decrypt some or all ofthe input content 102 and/or extraction information that is produced bythe watermark extractor 104. The encryption/decryption component 108 canbe configured to implement a variety of public- and/or private-keyencryption and/or decryption algorithms. The content handling device 100can further include an authentication component 120 that can produceauthentication parameters associated with the input content 102,authentication information associated with extraction information,and/or device authentication information (e.g., certificates). Forexample, the authentication component 120 can include a hash generationcomponent that generates hash values for a sequence of input values. Theauthentication component 120 can further compare newly generatedauthentication information with a previously stored authenticationinformation to verify an integrity of a content. The authenticationcomponent 120 can be configured to implement a variety of hashingalgorithms, such as MD5, SHA-1 and SHA-2. The authentication component120 may further be configured to carry out the necessary operations toeffect device authentication. As such, the authentication component 120can generate and communicate requests for device authentication,authentication information, exchange authentication certificates andverify the trustworthiness of another device.

FIG. 1 also illustrates one or more storage units 112 that can residewithin the content handling device 100. Such storage units 112 can storethe input content 102 (e.g., in encrypted, partially encrypted or clearformat), the information produced by the watermark extractor 104 and theassociated indexing information and meta data, content authenticationinformation, compliance rules associated with the usage of embeddedcontent and the associated enforcement actions, as well as computerprogram code that can be retrieved in order to implement any one of thefunctionalities of the disclosed embodiments. As such, the storage unit112 can be in communication with various components of the contenthandling device 100, such as the watermark extractor 104, the digitalsignature generator 106, the encryption component 108, theauthentication component 120, one or more processors within the contenthandling device 100 and the like. These components can retrieve andutilize the information, the computer codes and the content that arestored on the storage units 112. FIG. 1 also shows a storage unit 118that may reside outside of the content handling device 100. The outsidestorage unit 118, which may be in communication with the contenthandling device 100 through the communication component 110 via thecommunication link 120, can store some or all of the above noted inputcontent 102, watermark extraction records, as well as other data andprogram code. The communication component 110 may further allow thecontent handling device 100, or particular modules or components withthe content handling device 100, to communicate with the outside storageunit 188 and/or outside entities and users.

FIG. 1 also depicts a compliance enforcer 114 that can be configured toevaluate the enforcement logic associated with the extracted watermarksof a particular content, and enforce the rules associated withenforcement actions. For example, such enforcement actions can includeaborting the desired operation (e.g., not outputting the output content116), muting the audio and/or blanking the screen associated with theoutput content 116, and/or presenting a copyright restriction notice. Itshould be understood that the content handling device 100 can alsoinclude additional components, one or more processors or controllers andadditional memory devices that are not explicitly shown in FIG. 1. Forexample, a component within the content handling device may receiveinformation associated with other devices that can communicate with thecontent handling device 100. Such information can be received, forexample, through the communication component 110. The same, or aseparate, component within the content handling device 100 can makedecisions regarding the delegation of some or all of the screeningoperations (such as watermark extraction, screening, etc.) to thecomponents within the content handling device 100 (e.g., to watermarkextractor 104, compliance enforcer 114, etc.) and/or to other devicesthat can communicate with the content handling device 100. Thecomponents within the content handling device 100 can be implemented inhardware or software, or combinations thereof. In addition, while themedia handling device 100 of FIG. 1 is depicted as a single device, oneor more of the components or modules associated with the contenthandling device 100 may be implemented as part of a separate device. Forexample, the watermark extractor 104 may be implemented in a firstdevice that is separate from a second device that implements thecompliance enforcer 114.

The watermark extraction that is carried out in accordance with thedisclosed embodiments can be executed whenever a new content is detected(e.g., within a home network, such as a DLNA-compliant network) andwhenever spare resources are available to certain trusted device withinthe DLNA-compliant network. This way, peak processing loads on any givendevice can be decreased by distributing the processing load over timeand/or over other devices with the home network. The disclosedembodiments further enable background watermark extraction to be carriedout in conjunction with other trusted devices that may reside outside ofthe home network and/or trusted devices that are part of a differentnetwork. For example, the background processing operations may beconducted, at least in-part, by trusted devices that reside within aDLNA-compliant network that can, directly or indirectly, communicatewith devices that may reside in a non-centralized network of devices ina secure fashion. Further details as to how trusted devices areidentified and utilized to carry out all, or part of the contentscreening operations will be discussed in the sections that follow. Insome examples, the background watermark extraction is executed with alow priority to ensure the availability of computational and memoryresources for other higher-priority operations and to improve user'sexperience.

To facilitate access and retrieval of the extraction information,extraction records can be indexed by the content file name (which, forexample, includes the file folder name or the path to the file), by auniversal resource locator (URL) associated with the watermarkextraction records. The extraction records can also contain the filesize of the associated content. Presence of a new content can bedetected by periodically searching for new file names on the device oradditional/affiliated devices that may reside within the home network.Alternatively, or additionally, the presence of a new content can bedetected whenever the opportunity for watermark extraction arises, suchas in situations where spare computational and memory resources becomeavailable.

FIG. 2 illustrates the operations associated with the generation ofextraction information and the usage of such information in accordancewith an exemplary embodiment. The process starts at 202, where watermarkextraction is performed. The results of the watermark extraction caninclude the payload value of extracted watermarks and an associated timestamp that designates the temporal location of the extracted watermarkwithin the content. The extraction information can further include afile name, a file size and other information associated with thecontent. At 204, content authentication information is generated. Thisinformation can be used to verify that the content has not been modifiedor tampered with. For example, at 204, a hash value associated with thecontent can be generated. As will be described in the sections thatfollow, hash value generation can ensure authenticity of the content andits proper correspondence to the associated extraction information. At206, a digital signature associated with the extraction information iscalculated. In one example, the digital signature is appended to theextraction information. At 208, at least a portion of the extractioninformation and the associated digital signature are encrypted. In oneexample, only the extraction information is encrypted, while in anotherexample, both the extraction information and the associated digitalsignature are encrypted. The fully, or partially, encrypted extractionrecord is then stored on a storage media at 210. Certain additionaloperations, such as indexing of the content items, compressing thecontent items, etc., may also be carried out at some point afterwatermark extraction 202 but before storage of extraction information208.

Referring to FIG. 2, the stored extraction information may be retrievedat a later instance in time (e.g., at the time of playback of thecontent). At 212, authenticity of the content is verified.Authentication of the content will be described in further details inthe sections that follow. If content authentication does not succeed(“NO” at 214), watermark extraction operations are conducted for thecontent by, for example, returning to block 202. If contentauthentication succeeds (“YES” at 214), the content use policyassociated with the extraction information is checked at 216. Forexample, the content use policy associated with a No Home Use watermarkpayload can prevent the playback of the content on a consumer device.The content use policy may be stored at a storage location internal orexternal to the content handling device. Additionally, or alternatively,the content use policy may be received from an outside entity, such as atrusted authority. At 218, the applicable enforcement actions (if any)are effected. For example, an audio portion of the output content can bemuted, or a copying operation can be aborted. Other examples of actionsthat may be effected in conformance with the content use policy include,but are not limited to, displaying a copyright notice, denying access tothe content, deleting the content, recording the content usage in thecontent handling device, sending content usage information to a remoteserver, playback or display of at least an advertisement stored locallyor transmitted from a remote server, playback or display of a reducedresolution of the content, contacting a remote server for permission toaccess the content, and/or fulfilling a payment transaction with aremote server. It should be noted that, in some embodiments, the contentuse policy associated with the extracted watermarks is stored along withthe extraction information in step 210. In these embodiments, prior tothe application of the enforcement action at 218, it must be ensuredthat the stored content use policy is up to date. In another embodiment,the applicable enforcement actions may also be stored along with theextraction information at 210.

The operations that are illustrated in the block diagram of FIG. 2 arealso applicable to the embodiments where the extraction of watermarksare carried out in real-time (e.g., as the content is being rendered,displayed, etc.). In such embodiments, the extraction information, at202, is produced in parallel with, or slightly earlier than, rendering aparticular segment of the content. The extraction information, which isstored, at least temporarily, at a storage location, can be accessed todetermine if an enforcement action is needed in conformance with theassociated content use policy. In real-time applications, the creationof a digital signature, at 206, and encryption of the extractioninformation, at 208, may not be feasible due to a lack of computationalresources. In these scenarios, the extraction information may be storedwithin a tamper-resistant portion of the watermark extractor.Implementation of tamper-resistant modules within a device (i.e., asoftware and/or a hardware device) can be carried out in accordance withtamper-resistant techniques and algorithms that are known in the art.

FIG. 3 illustrates the operations that are commenced upon the detectionof a new content file at a content handling device. In some embodiments,a new content is detected when a device encounters a new content andcommences the subsequent actions for obtaining the associated extractionrecords. In such scenarios, a “new content” is any content that does nothave a matching file and/or path names in the extraction records. Inother embodiments, a content handling device may monitor certainoperations, such as “save” and “import” operations, and triggeradditional operations if particular conditions are satisfied. In theseembodiments, a content that has a matching path and file name is stillconsidered a new content. Referring back to FIG. 3, at 302, the presenceof a new content is detected. If, at 304, it is detected that the filename is new (i.e., a content file name match cannot be found in theextraction records), the file is designated to be subject to watermarkextraction at 318. For example, the content can be placed on a waitinglist to be processed for watermark extraction. In one embodiment, acontent file is considered a new file if the file's base name(regardless of the file's full path name) does not exist within thedevice or an associated entity, such as a connected database. If thecontent file is not new (i.e. “NO” at 304), it is determined, at 306, ifthe new content and the existing content have an identical file size. Ifthe file sizes do not match (i.e., “NO” at 306), the process moves to318, where the content is designated for watermark extraction. If, at306, the file sizes do match (i.e., “YES” at 306), a contentauthentication operation is triggered at 308 (content authenticationprocedures will be described in the sections that follow). If contentauthentication fails (i.e., “NO” at 310), the content is designated forwatermark extraction at 318. Otherwise (i.e., “YES” at 310), it isdetermined, at 312, if the content path name is new (i.e., via comparingthe path name of the new content against the existing path name that issaved in the extraction record). If the path names are identical (i.e.,“NO” at 312), watermark extraction is omitted at 316. Otherwise, if thepath names are different (i.e., “YES” at 312), the extraction record isupdated with the new file location at 314 and watermark extraction isomitted at 316.

The flow diagram of FIG. 3 is intended to facilitate the understandingof the disclosed embodiments. Therefore, additional or fewer steps maybe undertaken in order to implement the various embodiments. It shouldbe also noted that in order to facilitate the search for new and/orduplicate files, the stored content files and/or the associatedextraction records may be indexed using a variety of indexing techniquesand parameters. For instance, the file name may be used as an index forsearching a database of content files.

In other embodiments, the device further verifies if the previouslyanalyzed files (e.g., files that have previously been subjected towatermark extraction) are still present on the device. This process canbe executed in association with the process of searching for new files,or it can be performed independently when spare resources are available,or when a delete action is executed on the device. If the contentassociated with an extraction record is removed from the device, theextraction record may also be removed to conserve memory resources andto reduce the computational efforts in searching through storedextraction records.

In some embodiments, where extraction information is not available atthe time of content use, watermark extraction can be executed atreal-time (i.e. on-the-fly). If enough computational and/or memoryresources are not available for both the execution of a real-timeextraction and usage of the content, the content use can be delayeduntil the watermark extraction process is at least partially completed.In some examples, watermark extraction and content usage are interleavedin time (e.g., watermark extraction over one segment is followed byusage of that segment) so that watermark extraction is always ahead ofcontent use.

An important security consideration is the possibility of contentmodifications or substitutions after the watermark extraction has beencompleted. For example, an unmarked content may be initially imported,and then an external program may attempt to replace watermark-bearingcomponent of the content with a new content (which may have embeddedwatermarks). In this process, an attacker may intentionally preserve thesame file name and file size to prevent the content from beingdesignated for watermark extraction. To foil this attempt, the devicemust authenticate the content before using the stored extractioninformation. This operation was previously described in connection withstep 212 in FIG. 2.

Content authentication can be quickly and securely carried out usingone-way cryptographic hash function such as MD5, SHA-1 or SHA-2. Duringthe watermark extraction process on a newly imported file, a hash valueis calculated and saved together with the extraction results, asdepicted in FIG. 2, steps 204 to 210. When content usage is commenced, ahash value for the content is computed and compared to the previouslystored hash value (e.g., at 212 in FIG. 2). If the newly computed valuesmatch the stored hash values, the content is deemed to be authentic and,therefore, the associated extraction information can be used to effectany applicable enforcement actions. Otherwise, if the calculated andstored hash values do no match, the usage of the content may be fully orpartially disabled (e.g., copying aborted, playback stopped, copyrightnotice displayed, etc.). Additionally, or alternatively, the content canbe designated to undergo a new watermark extraction operation (see,e.g., FIG. 2, “NO” at step 214 and FIG. 3, “NO” at step 310).

In some embodiments, the content authentication information (e.g., ahash value) is produced (e.g. at step 204 in FIG. 2) when the content isin encrypted format. This way, when content authentication is conducted(e.g., at step 212 in FIG. 2), there is no need to decrypt the contentbefore verifying the content's authenticity. Therefore, at the moment ofcontent use, the disclosed embodiments only require the generation ofthe content authentication information (e.g., a hash value) rather thanundertaking a full watermark extraction operation. This aspect of thedisclosed embodiments provides a substantial improvement in efficiencyof operations of a content handling device, especially in cases wherecontent transformations, such as decryption, decompression,de-multiplexing etc., are required prior to watermark extraction. Manyhash functions can be implemented efficiently in hardware and/orsoftware. In some instances, where the watermark extraction records areencrypted (see, e.g., FIG. 2, step 208), the stored extractioninformation must be decrypted in order to retrieve the stored hashvalues. However, since the size of the stored watermark extractionrecord is relatively small, such a decryption operation is not likely topresent a significant processing burden.

A critical requirement in selecting a hash function is the pre-imageresistance, defined as follows: given a hash value h, it should be hard(almost certainly beyond the reach of any adversary) to find a message msuch that h=hash(m). This requirement is related to an attack where apirate tries to substitute a marked content with an unmarked content,which has the same hash value, in order to create an extraction-freewatermark extraction report. In this attack scenario, after the contenthandling device conducts a watermark extraction on an unmarked content,the attacker may attempt to replace the unmarked content with a markedcontent with the same hash value to avoid the screening of markedcontent.

It should be noted that the above noted pre-image requirement is easierto satisfy than a collision resistance requirement. The collisionresistance requirement can be defined as follows: it should be hard tofind two different messages m1 and m2 such that hash(m1)=hash(m2). Thisrequirement, which is more common if hash functions are used forindexing schemes, typically necessitates the use of more demanding hashfunctions, such as the SHA-2 family of hash functions. However, inscenarios where the less stringent pre-image resistance provides thesufficient protection, simpler and less computationally demanding hashfunctions, such as MD5 and SHA-1 may be used.

In some embodiment, further reductions in processing load associatedwith hash function calculation can be achieved by selecting only asubset of data from the content to be input to hash functioncalculation. In one example, the selection process is maintained as asecret. For instance, random content segments can be selected using arandom number generator that uses the device private key as a seed.

The disclosed embodiments further provide for the operation of a contenthandling device by considering security concerns related to mosaicattacks. A mosaic attack is defined as breaking up a content intomultiple segments such that each content segment can individually evadean enforcement action. In this attack scenario, a content is dividedinto segments that are individually subject to watermark extraction.During the actual content use, the segments are assembled again forpresentation to the user using, for example, a playlist feature atcontent rendering instance. A coarse mosaic attack typically involvesproducing relatively large content segments. For example, a featuremovie may be segmented into several 10-minute chunks in order to avoidTrusted Source (TS) enforcement on individual segments. This attack canbe successful for a TS-marked content since, as noted earlier, repeatedwatermark extractions in several content segments are required totrigger an enforcement action.

In one embodiment, a coarse mosaic attack can be circumvented in acompliant device by safely storing the content use history associatedwith that device, and subsequently retrieving and analyzing the contentuse history with each new content use. The content use history providesa record of all watermark extractions, together with an associated timestamp, within a predefined interval (e.g., for at least the last 20minutes content use by the device). Watermark extraction results for anynew content use can then be appended to the retrieved content usehistory data in order to evaluate if an enforcement condition ispresent. In the case of a mosaic attack that utilizes a playlist, theevaluation of an enforcement condition can be based on an aggregate of aretrieved content use history and the extraction record for each item onthe playlist in the listed order. This way, the enforcement conditioncan be efficiently evaluated without having to conduct a real-timewatermark extraction operation content use commences.

Another attack scenario relates to a fine mosaic attack, in which acontent is divided into a large number of segments with fine granularitysuch that watermark extraction from each individual segment is notfeasible. A fine mosaic attack implies a significant overhead due tosmall file handling and, therefore, may not be practical for manydevices. For example, a feature movie may be segmented into one-secondclips and saved as a string of independent files that are laterconcatenated using some kind of playlist function. Nonetheless, inaccordance with the disclosed embodiments, fine mosaic attacks can beeffectively thwarted by properly recognizing the presence of such anattack. In one embodiment, the existence of content files below acertain size limit triggers a fine mosaic countermeasure. For example,the detection of audio-visual content files that are less than fiveseconds long may be a flag that triggers fine mosaic countermeasuresduring a watermark extraction process.

In one embodiment, a fine mosaic attack is thwarted by requiringwatermark extraction over a number of concatenated files provided in aplaylist. Watermark extraction over the concatenated files can becarried out prior to the content use, or in real-time, during thecontent use. In one embodiment, if the concatenated file contains a mixof files below and above the size limit, watermark extraction isperformed only for the set of adjacent short files with a total lengthabove the size limit. The result of this extraction process can becombined with the results of extraction information for the files abovethe size limit (which should have been previously conducted), and usedfor enforcement logic evaluation and/or enforcement.

In an alternative embodiment, an advanced watermark extractor may beinstantiated upon the detection of a fine mosaic attack. The advancedextractor can perform the bulk of the processing in the background mode,and save intermediate data for future use. For example, the intermediatedata can consist of content features that are relevant for watermarkextraction and have a size that can be much smaller than the originalcontent. This feature of the disclosed embodiments can result in asignificant reduction in the usage of computational and memoryresources. Therefore, upon the detection of a fine mosaic attack, thedevice can quickly and efficiently extract the embedded watermarks justby evaluating the intermediate data as opposed to attempting to extractthe watermarks from the original content. For example, in a system thatuses spread spectrum watermarking, the intermediate data can comprisecorrelation values between a known spread spectrum carrier and thecontent samples with a particular granularity. At the moment of contentuse, the intermediate data is concatenated, watermark extraction isattempted and enforcement condition is evaluated based on any watermarksextracted from the intermediate data. As noted earlier, in someembodiments, if the concatenated file contains a mix of files that arebelow and above the size limit, the intermediate data concatenation andwatermark extraction are needed only for the set of adjacent short fileswith total length above the size limit. The result of this extractionprocess can be combined with the extraction information associated withthe files above the size limit, and used for enforcement logicevaluation and/or enforcement.

In scenarios where a network of trusted devices can be established, itmay be advantageous to use the network to share the watermark extractionand enforcement responsibilities. In one embodiment, if a device with anew content item is not able to interpret the content's format, thedevice may entrust all, or a portion of, the watermark extractionoperations to another device that can interpret the content format. Thedevice that performs the watermark extraction may report the extractioninformation to the delegating device for further action and/or securestorage.

FIG. 4 illustrates an exemplary embodiment in which an invocation modelis used to enable cooperative watermark extraction. In this embodiment,a master device 404, which receives an input content 402, is tasked withperforming an operation (e.g., copying, transferring, playing,recording, etc.) that produces an output content 406. As depicted inFIG. 4, the master device 404 invokes a slave device 412 to performwatermark extraction on a selected content 408 that is communicated tothe slave device 412. Upon full or partial completion of watermarkextraction by the slave device 412 the master device 404 receives theextraction information 410 and decides if the selected content 408 willbe delivered to the destination device and/or if additional enforcementactions, such as muting or displaying a warning message, are warranted.This invocation model can be applied in situations where the masterdevice 404 doesn't have the capability of watermark extraction or it isoverloaded (e.g. in case of multiple instances of streaming or watermarkextraction tasks) or it does not have appropriate codecs to handle theselected content.

FIG. 5 illustrates another exemplary embodiment in which a delegationmodel is used to enable cooperative watermark extraction. In thisembodiment, a delegating device 504, which is tasked with performing anoperation on an input content 402 (e.g., copying, transferring, playing,recording, etc.), completely delegates the watermark extraction to adelegated device 510. The delegated device 510 receives the selectedcontent 508 from the delegating device 504 and performs the watermarkextraction operations. The delegated device 510 further decides whetheror not to forward the requested content (i.e., the trusted content 512if the decision is made to forward the content) to a destination device514 in accordance with the content use policy associated with theextraction information 514. In one scenario, the delegated deviceperforms the watermark extraction and screening operations whilestreaming the content until the content use policy limits the use of thecontents (e.g. stop of the streaming or muted audio). In anotherscenario, the transfer of the content to the destination may start onlyafter the partial or full completion of the watermark extraction andscreening. Further, the delegated device 510 may or may not return theextraction information 514 to the delegating device 504 (this optionaloperation is depicted by the dashed arrow in FIG. 5 that starts from thedelegated device 510 and terminates at the delegating device 504). Thedelegating model can be used in various scenarios where the delegatingdevice 504 doesn't have the capability of watermark extraction or it isoverloaded (e.g. in case of multiple instances of streaming or watermarkextraction tasks) or it does not have appropriate codecs to handle therequested content. In particular, this model is useful in the scenarioswhere the presence of a bridge device (e.g., the delegated device 510)is needed to enable a content transformation, such as converting ahigh-definition content to an MPEG-4 mobile version, and the like.

In both invocation and delegation models, the devices that maycooperatively perform screening may be aware of the codecs capabilitybilaterally or unilaterally. They may inquire or exchange the codecscapability before or at the beginning of the transfer of the selectedcontent. For example, in DLNA that adopts HTTP protocol for contenttransfer, a device uses the MIME-TYPE values that are defined in DLNAMedia Format Profiles as values for Content-Type in a HTTP request orresponse to specify the codecs of the requested content. Other contenttransfer protocols such as RTP (Real-time Transport Protocol) alsosupport exchange of codecs capability.

In some systems that utilize invocation or delegation models, it may bepossible that the sender of the selected content (either master device404 or delegating device 504) is not aware of the codec capability of areceiving device (either a slave device 410 or a delegated device 510).In some embodiments, in such situations, if the receiving device doesnot have the appropriate codecs that are required to process therequested content, the receiving device informs the sender of theexception immediately (as part of extraction information 514). Thereceiving device may also optionally request the sender to convert andre-transfer the content in a media format that can be processed by thereceiving device.

In real-time watermark extraction scenarios, cooperative watermarkextraction in accordance with the disclosed embodiments can beimplemented in situations where a first device accesses the content anda second device renders (e.g., displays) that content. In thesescenarios, the content-accessing device is usually unable to interpretthe content, while the rendering device (which is, of course, ableinterpret the content) is not trusted. In this case, thecontent-accessing device may initiate a search to discover a trusteddevice that can interpret the content. Such a trusted device must alsobe able to execute watermark extractions at a rate faster than, or equalto, the real-time rendering of the content. The trusted device may, forexample, be identified by consulting a list of trusted devices that canbe securely accessed by the content-accessing device. Such a list canalso be communicated securely to the content accessing device from atrusted authority. In another embodiment, the list is created duringdevice discovery based on UPnP (Universal Plug and Play) networkingprotocols. For example, DLNA uses UPnP for discovery and description ofdevice types and capabilities. In other embodiments, a deviceauthentication procedure is commenced to verify the trustworthiness of adevice and to ascertain its capabilities. Device authenticationprocedures will be further described in the sections that follow. Theextraction results and/or enforcement events that are produced by thetrusted device may be returned to the content accessing device forfurther action and/or secure storage.

The above-noted real-time watermark extraction scenario can beconsidered an example of the invocation model described above. Thisexample scenario allows a commercial content to be delivered on a legacyrendering device (e.g. DLNA TV without a watermark extractor). Toencourage the adoption of trusted rendering devices, incentives may beprovided by the content owners, PayTV companies and Over-the-top (OTT)and on-demand content providers to the users who render the premiumcontent directly on a trusted rendering device. Alternatively, a flag ina DRM-protected commercial content may be inserted by the contentdistributor to indicate that the content must be rendered by a trustedclient.

In some embodiments, if a real-time watermark extraction operation isnot feasible (even with the cooperation of additional trusted devices),a delayed watermark extraction operation may, nevertheless, be conductedwhenever the necessary resources become available. The results that areproduced by the delayed watermark extraction operation may be stored aspart of the extraction record for that content. For example, thewatermark extraction record may be stored at a database, where it can beaccessed in the future by one or more trusted devices. In scenarios thata delayed watermark extraction operation is performed, any subsequentreal-time access to that content can be readily screened using thestored extraction records.

Another aspect of real-time applications (e.g., live streaming of avideo content) is that only a fraction of the content is made availablebefore its rendering. In these cases, it may not possible to executewatermark extraction, using only locally available resources, prior tothe content use. Therefore, as noted earlier, a real-time watermarkextraction operation may be needed. In some embodiment, the need forconducting a real-time watermark extraction may be eliminated byproviding an extraction record that is produced by a trusted device toaccompany the streaming content. As noted earlier, contentauthentication can ensure the integrity of the content and its propercorrespondence with an existing extraction record. However, in thecontext of a streaming application, full authentication of the streamingcontent may not be possible during the streaming of the content sincethe full content only becomes available at the end of the streamingsession.

In some embodiments, authentication of one or more portions of a contentis enabled by utilizing segmented hash values. In particular, thecontent is divided into segments of a particular size (e.g., 10 secondsin time or 1 MB in size) and a hash value is generated for each contentsegment and stored together with the corresponding watermark extractionrecord. This way, a content may be authenticated in smaller unitsaccording to the granularity of content segments with the calculatedhash values. During the streaming operation, a received content segment(e.g., that resides in a buffer) can be authenticated by calculating itscorresponding hash value and comparing it to the hash value stored inthe extraction record. The segments can be selected sequentially andcontiguously for authentication as they become available during thestreaming operation. Alternatively, a subset of content segments can beselected for authentication. In one embodiment, a subset of segments maybe selected according to a deterministic pattern (e.g., every thirdsegment is selected) or according to a random/pseudo-random selectionpattern (e.g., random selection with uniform distribution). Anauthentication failure, for even one segment, can signal that thecontent has been manipulated and, therefore, trigger the real-timeextraction operation. Alternatively, a detection of content manipulationcan abort the content use.

According to the disclosed embodiments, a segmented hash value iscomposed of a sequence of hash values, where each hash value iscalculated from a segment of content. The segment can be defined by afixed time period or fixed byte size of the content. Moreover, the finalcontent may be padded to produce a segment with the pre-defined fixedsize. One exemplary algorithm for generating a segmented hash functionis described as follows. Let's assume that C is an audio-visual content,and c₁, c₂, . . . c_(n) are consecutive segments of C, or randomlyselected segments of C. In case of selection of segments, theflexibility between authentication granularity and performance can beachieved. For example, for better computation performance, fewersegments can be selected. The size of segment will also have an impacton the performance as measured by computational and resource efficiency.In particular, smaller segments require fewer computations forauthenticating that particular segment. However, a minimum segment sizelimit may be required to ensure the security of the hash function.

In one embodiment, the security of the generated hash values can furtherbe enhanced by providing a segment size that varies within a particularrange, as determined by, for example, a random number generator. Anexemplary algorithm for generating hash values associated with variablesegment sizes is described as follows. Let's assume HF is a hashfunction that accepts a seed value, s, and a block of data, c_(n), toproduce a hash value, h_(n). The hash values for segments c₁, c₂, . . .c_(n) can be calculated using the following set of operations:

$\begin{matrix}{{{h_{1} = {{HF}\left( {s,c_{1}} \right)}};}{{h_{2} = {{HF}\left( {h_{1},c_{2}} \right)}};}\ldots{h_{n} = {{{HF}\left( {h_{n - 1},c_{n}} \right)}.}}} & (1)\end{matrix}$

A hash value, H_(i), for a content up to the segment c_(i)(1<i<n) can becalculated as follows.H _(i)=HF(s,h ₁ +h ₂ + . . . +h _(i))  (2)

One major advantage of using hash values for content identification isthat the hash function takes the streaming content as a binary stream,regardless of the content format, whether or not the content isencrypted and which cryptographic algorithms are used for theencryption. The disclosed embodiments can be used in conjunction withdifferent hash functions. For example, an MD5 implementation in softwareon a Pentium 90 MHz computer can process the input data at 45 mega bitsper second. To further speed up the hashing process, instead of everybyte, some selective bytes from each segment can be taken as the inputto the hash function.

In another real-time watermark extraction scenario, cooperativewatermark extraction in accordance with the disclosed embodiment may beimplemented in situations where a content-accessing device lacks theprocessing power to simultaneously carry out content access,transmission, rendering, and watermark extraction. In particular, such ascenario may arise when the same device is configured to conductsimultaneous access and transmission of multiple content streams. Inthese scenarios, watermark extraction can be delegated to a capable andtrusted device. The extraction information and/or enforcement events maybe returned to the content-accessing device for further action and/orsecure storage. This real-time cooperative watermark extraction isanother example of the invocation model described above.

FIG. 6 illustrates another example embodiment, in which a content isdelivered to a content client device 604 by a content server 602. Thecontent server 602 and/or the content client device 604 may be incommunication with a storage unit 606, a slave device 608 and/or adelegated device 610. Depending on the system configuration, the contentserver 602 and/or the client content device 604 may communicate as amaster device with the slave device 608, as discussed earlier inconnection with the invocation model of FIG. 4. Similarly, depending onthe system configuration, the content server 602 and/or the clientcontent device 604 may communicate as a delegating device with thedelegated device 610, as discussed earlier in connection with thedelegation model of FIG. 5. The communication links 612 that aredepicted in FIG. 6 enable communications of content, extractioninformation and other information between the devices that are shown inFIG. 6. For example, one or more of the communication links 612 canallow secure communications (e.g., through link encryption) between thedifferent devices. Further, one or more of the content server 602,content client device 604, storage unit 606, slave device 608 anddelegated device 610 may reside within a home network, such as a DLNA.In other embodiments, one or more of the content server 602, the contentclient device 604, the storage unit 606, the slave device 608 and thedelegated device 610 may reside outside of a home network.

With reference to FIG. 6, it can be appreciated that watermarkextraction and implementation of applicable screening operations andenforcement actions can be carried out using one or more of the depicteddevices in real-time and non-real time applications. Further, thecontent handling devices that are depicted in FIG. 6 may reside within anetwork (such as a DLNA-compliant network) that can include a pluralityof other server devices, client devices, storage units and the like,that can, directly or indirectly communicate with each other. Inaddition, the devices that are located within such a network may be incommunication with a plurality of other devices that reside outside ofthe network. In some embodiments, a gateway device 614 may be incommunication, through a communication link 612, with one or more of theother devices that are depicted in FIG. 6 and/or other devices thatreside within or outside of a home network. The gateway device 614 can,for example, coordinate the operations of various devices to facilitatewatermark extraction, transfer of extraction records, authenticationoperations, communication and/or acquisition of trusted device lists,and the like. Further details regarding the operations of the gatewaydevice 614 will be discussed in the sections that follow.

In some scenarios, a large number of content handling devices, such asthe ones that are depicted in FIG. 6, may be in communication with oneanother to exchange content files or to conduct other operations.However, it is likely that only a subset of such content handlingdevices have the capability to conduct watermark extraction, evaluatethe extraction records against content use policy and/or effectenforcement actions. Therefore, the task remains as to how to properlyidentify trustworthy devices that have all, or a portion of, suchcapabilities. It is further necessary to determine the most effectiveand secure way to distribute the required workload among the variousdevices, and to conduct various communications between the devices.

Device authentication, which is carried out in accordance with thedisclosed embodiments, enables each device to verify that another deviceis a “trusted” device. By establishing the trustworthiness of thedevices, the capabilities of each device may be communicated to oneanother. FIG. 7 illustrates an authentication procedure that may becarried out between Device A 702 and Device B 704 in accordance with anexample embodiment. In operation 706, Device A 702 transmits itscertificate to Device B 704. In operation 708, Device B 704 verifies thereceived certificate of Device A 702, thereby determining Device A'strustworthiness, as well as some or all capabilities of Device A 702. Inone example, trusted device authentication enables Device B 704 toverify that the certificate provided by Device A 702 is issued from atrusted authority. Analogously, in operation 710, Device B 704 maytransmit its certificate to Device A 702. In operation 712, Device A 702determines if Device B 704 is a trusted device and further ascertainsDevice B's capabilities. It should be noted that the authenticationprocess can include additional operations that are known in the art. Forinstance, the authentication process can also include the communicationof one or more challenges, and the corresponding responses, betweenDevice A 702 and Device B 704. In some embodiments, these additionaloperations are conducted to ensure that the communicated information isnot being merely copied from cached locations.

In some embodiments, device authentication may be carried out using aDCTP-IP authentication protocol. DTCP-IP specification includes amandatory Full Authentication and an optional Extended FullAuthentication procedure. DTCP-IP uses Advanced Encryption Standard(AES)-128 for content encryption. Both authentication procedures ofDTCP-IP employ a public key based Elliptic Curve Digital SignatureAlgorithm (EC-DSA) for signing and verification. Device Certificateissued by the Digital Transmission Licensing Administrator (DTLA) (i.e.,the licensing administrator and developer of DTCP-IP) is stored in thecompliant device and used during the authentication process, Allcompliant devices are also assigned a unique Device ID and devicepublic/private key pair generated by the DTLA. The Device Certificatecomprises a plurality of fields that include information regardingcertificate format, Device ID, digital signature, DTCP public key andthe like. The use of DTCP-IP authentication protocol allows theauthenticating device to confirm that the authenticated device is inpossession of private keys issued by the DTLA after certifying that thedevice is compliant.

In one exemplary embodiment, some of the reserved bits associated with aDTCP-IP Device Certificate may be used to signal the device's contentscreening (e.g., watermark extraction and enforcement) capabilities.Therefore, such a Device Certificate can be used to determine if adevice is a trusted device and to obtain information regarding thedevice's screening capabilities. In other embodiments, additionalinformation such as a location of an extraction record database may beexchanged between the two devices. The devices may further exchangeinformation regarding their processing and storage capabilities.

In another embodiment, device authentication may employ remoteattestation to obtain increased assurance that the authenticated deviceis compliant. Remote attestation employs a cryptographic protocolbetween the authenticating and authenticated devices to enable theauthenticating device to establish that the authenticated device wascertified as compliant and has not been modified. The protocol requiresthat the authenticated device perform specific computations (or“measurements”) of its internal processing state (such as computinghashes of data or code or performing timing measurements on itscomputing operations) whose results provide the authenticating devicewith certainty that its operation at the time of measurement match thosethat were performed at the time the device was certified as behaving ina compliant manner. In one exemplary embodiment, remote attestation maybe performed using a “hardware root of trust” such as a Trusted PlatformModule (TPM) or other secure processing unit. A TPM is a hardware devicethat can securely store passwords, certificates, encryption keys, andother values in an internal memory and apply a very limited set ofcryptographic primitives to those values, based on instructions andother data values received from a more general purpose computerprocessor such as a CPU. The values stored in internal memory of a TPMare maintained as secret and can only be accessed through the limitedcryptographic functions of the TPM. The TPM typically is contained in aseparate computer chip from the CPU (such as affixed to the motherboardof a PC) but may also be incorporated into a system-on-a-chip thatcontains both the TPM and one or more CPU and other hardware functions.Storing this data on the hardware chip, instead of on a computer harddrive or within memory directly accessible by a general purpose CPUenables the establishment of a “hardware root of trust” for the device'sbehavior and significantly increases the security of the entireplatform. This hardware storage location ensures that the storedinformation is more secure from external software attack and physicaltheft. TPM provides three kinds of security functionality: 1) securestorage of any data that is encrypted by keys only available to the TPM;2) measurement and reporting of integrity of platform including BIOS,boot sector, operating system and application software; and 3)authentication of a platform or application-specific data via digitalsignatures using signing keys that are protected by TPM.

To enable device authentication in a TPM platform, a trusted party (e.g.the Certificate Authority) will sign the signing keys that are protectedby TPM. Such certificates that are also protected by TPM are used toprove that a signing key really does belong to a valid TPM. Two deviceswith TPM-protected certificates and signing keys may carry out theauthentication process in the same matter as discussed above based onDTCP-IP authentication. The only difference is that the signing keys ina TPM platform is more secure.

A TPM-enabled device may authenticate another non-TPM-enabled device,Such authentication may result in unequal trustworthiness which then canbe used by a service provider to offer distinct services. For example, ahigh-value content (e.g., a high-definition or an earlier release of acontent) may only be delivered to TPM-enabled devices while othercontent can be delivered to both TMP-enabled and non-TPM-enableddevices.

The TPM contains a number of 160-bit registers called platformconfiguration registers (PCRs) to measure and report the status of aplatform's environment in a trusted matter. Starting from a root oftrust, it enables a trusted entity to obtain unforgeable informationabout the platform state. An executable program can measure anotherprogram by computing its hash code and combine the current measurementwith the hash value and store the combination in a PCR. Thus, PCRsrepresent an accumulated measurement of the history of executed programsfrom power-on to the present. Such a chain of trust provides a powerfuldefense against malicious programs, such as viruses, spyware and attackson vulnerable programs. It can also be used to detect and disableunauthorized programs such as pirated software or unlawful programs.

A software media player, especially in a PC environment, has been a weakpoint in most content protection systems. Extending the chain of trustto the media player on a TPM platform strengthens the security byenabling the detection and further disabling of unauthorized programsand/or modifications to the software player.

TPM can create migratable or non-migratable keys for data encryption.Migratable keys never leave the TPM that creates them while migratablekeys can exported to other platforms (devices). Therefore, a content canbe locked into a TPM-enabled device by encrypting the content using aTPM-created non-migratable key so that the content can only be decryptedand played on that device. This is understood to be but one approach toperforming remote attestation using a “hardware root of trust.” However,other methods and devices which are currently known, or may become knownin the future, may be used to accomplish the purpose of deviceauthentication.

Based on the assessment of the trusted status of various devices andtheir capabilities, the various operations that are required to ensurethe proper watermark extraction and screening operations associated witha content can be shared among those devices. In order to facilitate thediscussion, the operations associated with providing a content from thecontent server to the content client device (see, e.g., the contentserver 602 and the content client device 604 of FIG. 6) can be dividedinto (1) watermark extraction and (2) screening. For example, watermarkextraction can include, but is not limited to, the extraction ofwatermarks, the calculation of content authentication information, thegeneration of digital signatures, and the storage of the results in asecure location. Screening on the other hand, can include, but is notlimited to, the verification of content authenticity, the acquisitionand verification of the content use policy and the implementation ofenforcement actions (if needed). It is also understood that some overlapbetween watermark extraction and screening operations can exist. Forexample, certain operations, such as the acquisition and verification ofcompliance rules, can be conducted as part of one or both the watermarkextraction and the screening operations. Therefore, the above-noteddivision of operations is merely presented to facilitate understandingof the underlying concepts and is not intended to limit the scope of thedisclosed embodiments.

Depending on whether or not a device is trusted (i.e. authenticated ascompliant), the extent of availability of computational resources,compliance capability, the required security of operations, architectureand design complexity, the user experience considerations, preferencesof the content owners and other factors, watermark extraction andscreening operations can be conducted by one or more devices that mayreside within and/or outside of a home network. For example, Table 1provides a listing of how the responsibility of watermark extraction andscreening can be shared among the various devices in eight exemplaryscenarios.

TABLE 1 Example Division of Operations Watermark Scenario ResponsibleDevice(s) Extraction Screening 1 Content Client Device Content ClientContent Client Device Device 2 Content Client Device Slave DeviceContent Client Device 3 Content Client Device Delegated Device DelegatedDevice 4 Content Server Content Server Content Server 5 Content ServerSlave Device Content Server 6 Content Server Delegated Device DelegatedDevice 7 Content Client Device Content Server Content Client and ContentServer Device 8 Content Client Device Content Client Content Server andContent Server Device

Table 1 illustrates that, in scenario 1, both the watermark extractionand screening operations are carried out at the content client devicewhile, in scenario 4, both operations are carried out at the contentserver. In the remaining scenarios, the watermark extraction andscreening operations are conducted through cooperation of the contentclient device, the content server, a delegated device and/or a slavedevice. In particular, in scenario 2, the content client device invokesa slave device which conducts the watermark extraction. For example,such a slave device can be another trusted content client device ortrusted server device with watermark extraction capabilities. Inscenario 3, the content client device, which is a trusted device,delegates both the watermark extraction and screening operations to atrusted delegated device. Scenarios 4 through 6 provide analogs ofscenarios 1 through 3. But in scenarios 4 through 6 the content serveris the responsible device which may undertake the screening operationson its own, invoke a slave device to conduct the screening operations,or delegate these operations to a delegated device. In scenario 7, thecontent server conducts the watermark extraction operation and thecontent client device performs the screening. In scenario 8, the contentclient device conducts the watermark extraction operation and thecontent server performs the screening.

It can be appreciated that the exemplary listings of Table 1 do notprovide an exhaustive listing of all cooperative scenarios. For example,a variation of scenario 7 can be constructed where the watermarkextraction is implemented by the content server through invocation of aslave device. As noted earlier, the selection of one or more trusteddevices to conduct a particular operation in cooperation with one ormore trusted devices can be influenced by a variety of factors, such asthe user preferences, complexity of implementation and the like. Table 2provides an exemplary evaluation of the eight scenarios of Table 1 basedon six different factors.

TABLE 2 Exemplary Evaluation of Scenarios 1 to 8 IntegrationAvailability Complexity for of Content Overall Processing DeviceConsumer Architecture in Suitable Preference Scenario PerformanceManufacturer Experience Complexity Format Rank S1 Very Good Medium VeryGood High Yes 1 S2 Fair High Potential Poor Medium to High May be 7 S3Fair Medium to High Fair to Good Medium to High Likely 8 S4 PotentialPoor Medium Very Good Low Likely No 2 S5 Fair High Potential Poor Low toMedium May Be 6 S6 Fair to Good Medium to High Fair to Good Low toMedium Likely 4 S7 Potential Poor Medium Very Good Low Likely No 5 S8Very Good medium Very Good High Yes 3

The exemplary evaluations of Table 2 provide a rough assessment of themerits for each configuration of devices in scenarios 1 through 8. Table2 further includes a limited number of factors for illustrationpurposes. However, it is understood that additional factors, such ascomputational load and memory capabilities of each device, preferencesof the content owner and the like, can also be considered in making anassessment of each scenario. The right-most column of Table 2 providesan overall preference ranking for each scenario. This overall rankingmay be produced by considering all the evaluated items that are listedin Table 2 and/or additional factors that are not listed in Table 2. Inone embodiment, such an overall preference ranking is used as a defaultsetting, which prescribes a particular configuration of devices in theabsence specific instructions that favors other configurations.

A review of Table 2 reveals that, even if both the content server andthe content client device are capable of performing watermark extractionand/or screening operation, it may be preferred to assign certainoperations to one or both of the devices (or even a third device such asa delegated or slave device) to accommodate particular preferences. Inaccordance with the disclosed embodiments, if both the client contentdevice and the content server are trusted entities, then they canascertain the capabilities of one another, and decide how to mosteffectively conduct the watermark extraction and screening operations.If only one of the devices is a trusted device, then that device mustdetermine how to independently, or in cooperation with other trusteddevices, carry out the necessary watermark extraction and screeningoperations.

FIG. 8 is a flow diagram associated with watermark extraction andscreening operations that are conducted in a collaborative fashion inaccordance with an exemplary embodiment. At 802, a request for access toa content is detected. Such a request is typically initiated by acontent client device and is directed to a content server. However, insome examples, the requests may be communicated between content clientdevices, content servers and/or other devices. At 804, in response tothe detection of a request for access to the content, deviceauthentication is performed. For example, a device authentication thatwas described in connection with FIG. 7 may be performed to determinethe trusted status of the devices and to obtain certain devicecapabilities. If it is determined, at 806, that both devices are trusted(i.e., “YES” at 806), certain device capabilities may be optionallyexchanged between the two trusted devices at 808. As noted earlier, someor all of the device capabilities may be exchanged during deviceauthentication step at 804. However, in some embodiments, deviceauthentication and acquisition of device capabilities may be conductedin separate steps. For example, certain device capabilities, such aswhether or not a device can perform watermark extraction or screening,can be ascertained during the authentication step (i.e., at 804), whileother device capabilities, such as whether or not a device has sparecomputational resources to conduct additional operations, areascertained during a subsequent information exchange operation (i.e., at808).

Referring back to FIG. 8, at 810, the two devices collaborativelydetermine the proper operational configuration. This step allows thedivision of labor between the two trusted devices (and/or additionaltrusted devices) based on a desired criterion. For example, anoperational configuration that correspond to one of scenarios S1 throughS8 (see Table 1) can be selected based on a preference that is listed inTable 2. Alternatively, an available operational configuration may beselected with the highest overall preference ranking. At 812, watermarkextraction and/or content screening operations are conducted by theappropriate devices that were selected at 810. It should also be notedthat content screening operations at 812 may simply comprise receivingan existing watermark extraction record from a trusted device (or from asecure storage location that is known to a trusted device) andconducting screening in accordance with the received extraction record(e.g., see steps 212 to 218 of FIG. 2). In other embodiments, where apre-existing watermark extraction record does not exist (or cannot beaccessed), watermark extraction and/or content screening operations canbe performed, at 812, by one or more trusted devices.

If at 806 in FIG. 8, the determination is “NO”, the process moves to814, where it is determined if only one device is trusted. Such adetermination can be made when, for example, a trusted content clientdevice fails to authenticate a content server. Alternatively, as will bedescribed in the sections that follow, a central authority can make sucha determination. If only one device is trusted (i.e., “YES” at 814), thetrusted device determines the proper configuration for conducting thewatermark extraction and/or screening operations, at 816. In doing so,the trusted device may utilize the services of other trusted devicesinside or outside of the home network. Upon determining the properconfiguration, the process moves to 812, where watermark extractionand/or content screening operations are conducted. If, at 814, it isdetermined that none of the devices are trusted (i.e., “NO” at 814), theprocess may be aborted (e.g., content access is denied) at 818.Alternatively, the content may be provided in a protected format (e.g.,in encrypted format). In some embodiments, the content is delivered in adegraded format. In still other embodiments, only a part of the contentis delivered.

The operations that are described in FIG. 8 may be repeated, at leastin-part, when each device within a home network is attempting to acquirea content, to provide a content, or solicit screeningservices/information from another device within the home network.Further, the above noted operations may also be carried out when atleast one of the devices resides outside of the home network, if amechanism for authentication between the devices inside and outside ofthe network exists.

Table 3 provides an exemplary listing of device configurationpossibilities that is organized based on the trusted status of the twodevices and the availability of watermark extraction and screeningcapabilities at the two devices. S1 through S8 represent the deviceconfigurations that were previously discussed in connection with theexemplary scenarios 1 through 8, respectively.

TABLE 3 Operational Configuration Possibilities based on ScreeningCapabilities Content Client Device Trusted Watermark ExtractionWatermark Extraction Available Not Available Screening ScreeningScreening Screening Not Available Not Available Available Not AvailableTrusted Content Trusted Watermark Screening S1, S2, S3, S3, S4, S5, S2,S3, S4, S3, S4, S5, S4, S5, S6 Server Extraction Available S4, S5, S6,S6, S8 S5, S6, S7 S6 Available S7, S8 Screening S1, S2, S3, S3, S6 S2,S3, S6, S3, S6 S6 Not Available S6, S7 S7 Watermark Screening S1, S2,S3, S3, S5, S6, S2, S3, S5, S3, S5, S6 S5, S6 Extraction Available S5,S6, S8 S8 S6 Not Available Screening S1, S2, S3, S3, S6 S2, S3, S6 S3,S6 S6 Not Available S6 Not trusted S1, S2, S3 S3 S2, S3 S3 N/A

Table 3 illustrates the availability of different operationalconfigurations based on the trusted status of each device and theavailable screening capabilities in accordance with an exemplaryembodiment. Once it is determined which of the operationalconfigurations are available, a particular configuration can be selectedto effect the desired screening operations. For example, as notedearlier, a configuration that provides the best overall preferenceranking may be selected.

By providing watermark extraction and screening capabilities to variousdevices and at various points of content distribution, securedistribution of content can be enabled. Separation of watermarkextraction and screening operations further facilitates theproliferation of “compliant” devices with limited computationalresources (such as mobile devices). Such compliant devices are trusteddevices that can, for example, implement only a portion of watermarkextraction and/or screening capabilities, and rely on other devices toprovide the remaining operational capabilities. FIG. 9 is an exemplarydiagram of different content distribution scenarios involving acompliant content server 902, a non-compliant content server 904, acompliant content client device 906, a non-compliant content clientdevice 908, as well as protected and unprotected content. A protectedcontent can be protected by a content protection mechanism, such asencryption. In such a scenario, as illustrated at 910, the protectedcontent can be played by, and is thus delivered to, a compliant contentclient device 906 that is capable of decrypting the content. This isillustrated at 910. However, it should be noted that such a protectedcontent may also be delivered to, at 920, the non-compliant contentclient device 908. The non-compliant content client device 908 may beable to use the protected content, if, for example, it has acquired thenecessary decryption capability. Such a capability can be acquired, forexample, illegally (e.g., a device is hacked or encryption keys arestolen), or legally (e.g., if the content owner decides to temporarilygrant the capability to a non-compliant client device 908).

Referring back to FIG. 9, the unprotected content, at 912, may bedelivered from the compliant content server 902 to the compliant contentclient device 906, which performs the watermark extraction and/orscreening operations. An unprotected content may also be delivered, at916, from the non-compliant content server 904 to the compliant contentclient device 906, which screens the content. The compliant contentdevice 906 may employ one of the previously noted cooperative methods toefficiently screen the unprotected content. FIG. 9 also illustrates thatan unprotected content may be delivered, at 914, from the compliantcontent server 902 to a non-compliant client content device 908. In thisscenario, the compliant content server 902 performs the necessarywatermark extraction and screening prior to delivering the content.

The exemplary content delivery architecture that is depicted in FIG. 9also accounts for the delivery, at 918, of an unprotected content (e.g.,a pirated content) from the non-compliant content server 904 to thenon-compliant content client device 908. As noted earlier, to reduce thelikelihood of unauthorized content use, the proliferation of compliantcontent client devices may be encouraged by providing incentives to thecontent users. Further, blocking the delivery of protected content (ordelivery of a partial content), at 920, to a non-compliant client device908 can encourage the user to acquire a compliant device. Such anupgrade is facilitated in accordance with the disclosed embodiments,since the non-compliant content client device 908 may only be requiredto acquire some or all of the screening capabilities. Acquisition ofsuch screening capabilities enables the device to receive protectedcontent (e.g., at 920). In addition, through the use of cooperativeextraction methods described earlier, the device can receive and screenunprotected content from a non-compliant content server 904.

As discussed earlier, it is possible that the compliant device, e.g. 902or 906, does not have the appropriate codecs that are required toperform watermark extraction and/or screening of a content that isencoded in a specific media format. One of the following polices may beapplied to this situation: 1) stop the transfer or use of the content;2) use one of the invocation or delegation models to conduct thewatermark extraction and/or screening; 3) allow the limited or unlimitedtransfer or use of the content (the limitations may include a maximumnumber of times that such transfer or usage is allowed).

In another embodiment that is particularly applicable to centralizedarchitectures, cooperative watermark extraction in accordance with thedisclosed embodiment may be implemented in situations where a specialtrusted device (e.g., a ‘gateway’ 614 that is depicted in FIG. 6)coordinates and controls other devices to enable content sharing andconsumption, as well as watermark extraction, screening and digitalrights management. As such, the gateway device may coordinate watermarkextraction, transfer of extraction records, authentication operations,communication and/or acquisition of trusted device lists, and the like.The gateway device typically resides inside of a home network (e.g., aDLNA-compliant network). In some embodiments, the communications betweenthe gateway and the various devices are encrypted.

The gateway device, which may be controlled directly by a serviceprovider, can be responsible for assigning watermark extraction tasks toone or more capable and trusted devices in a home network. For example,the gateway device can be the only device that is authorized to acquireand decrypt a protected content and/or to serve such a protected contentin a home network. The gateway device may further be able to control acompliant content server for content discovery, exposure, serving andtransport. The gateway device can also control a compliant contentclient device for content rendering.

In another example, the gateway device may be, additionally oralternatively, responsible for determining the appropriate operationalconfigurations that are necessary to conduct the various screeningoperations. The gateway device may also direct and synchronize thetrusted devices to conduct the screening operations. For example, thegateway may use one of the invocation and delegation models to effectthe necessary screening operations. In some embodiments, trusted deviceauthentication operations may also be conducted by the gateway device.Additionally, the gateway device may maintain a revocation list and mayhave the authority to revoke the trusted status of a device within thenetwork. Further, the gateway device may retain the content use policyassociated with different embedded watermarks. Such content use policymay be used to prescribe various enforcement actions. Such content usepolicy may also be communicated to various trusted devices. The gatewaydevice may also control screening and update the content use policy forpolicy enforcement.

In still other embodiments, the gateway device may be in communicationwith one or more external device (e.g., another gateway device, acontent server device, a content client device, etc.) that resideoutside of the home network. In these embodiments, the gateway devicemay control the flow of content, authentication information and otherinformation between the home network and the external devices.

According to some embodiments, all watermark extraction records may bestored in a central location that is accessible by the gateway. Thewatermark extraction records may additionally be duplicated on otherdevices on a home network. Further improvements in screening efficiencycan be achieved by secure and private exchange of watermark extractionrecords. The exchange must be conducted between trusted devices eitherwithin the home network (e.g., a DLNA-compliant network) or from a cloudspace via Internet. Exchange of extraction records may occur during theauthentication of two devices so that the security, includingconfidentiality and integrity, is ensured. For example, using theDTCP-IP's authentication protocol, any information (such as theextraction records) can be securely exchanged between the two devices.

A need for the exchange of extraction records between two devices mayarise if one of the devices does not have the extraction records. Inthis scenario, the records may be copied from one device onto the otherdevice. In another scenario, an exchange of records may be necessary tomerge and synchronize the records of both devices. In these situations,the exchange of records may be conducted in the following manner. If anextraction record of a content item identified by its file name or hashcode on the first device does not exist in the records on the seconddevice, the missing record can be added to the second device (and viceverse). If, on the other hand, a record for the same content item existson both devices, the record with the latest date and time stamp (e.g.,last modification date and time) is used to synchronize the contents ofthe two devices.

When the extraction records associated with a user are kept in thecloud, they can be considered as part of a central “virtual records”repository which allows or denies the user to render a content. Thesevirtual records can be organized in several ways. In one exampleembodiment, each user has a private virtual locker in the cloud for theextraction records corresponding to the content files in his/her homenetwork. The advantage of this configuration is that the user canubiquitously access the records to receive permissions to render his/hercontent. In another example embodiment, all virtual records from allusers (e.g., all users in a geographic region or all users of a serviceprovider) are stored in a universal locker. The extraction records canbe indexed by the hash code. Thus, only one record is needed to bestored in the cloud for a content item, from which a unique hash codecan be produced. One advantage of such organization is that theserecords are anonymous and less redundant.

In some embodiments, only a portion of the extraction records is storedin the cloud. In one example, only the extraction records thatcorrespond to successful content access requests are stored in thecloud. In another example, only the extraction records that correspondto unsuccessful content access requests are stored in the cloud. Inother embodiments, the privacy of the users is protected by either usinga trusted service or by obfuscating the source of the query. In stillother embodiments, certain users are given enhanced privileges tofacilitate access and exchange of extraction records. For example, suchprivileges may be granted to users with no record of unsuccessfulcontent access requests, whereas users with a history of unsuccessfulcontent access requests may have to accept some delays associated withadditional authentication and verification operations.

It is understood that the various embodiments of the present inventionmay be implemented individually, or collectively, in devices comprisedof various hardware and/or software modules and components. Thesedevices, for example, may comprise a processor, a memory unit, aninterface that are communicatively connected to each other, and mayrange from desktop and/or laptop computers, to consumer electronicdevices such as media players, mobile devices and the like. For example,FIG. 10 illustrates a block diagram of a device 1000 within which thevarious disclosed embodiments may be implemented. The device 1000comprises at least one processor 1002 and/or controller, at least onememory 1004 unit that is in communication with the processor 1002, andat least one communication unit 1006 that enables the exchange of dataand information, directly or indirectly, through the communication link1008 with other entities, devices and networks. The communication unit1006 may provide wired and/or wireless communication capabilities inaccordance with one or more communication protocols, and therefore itmay comprise the proper transmitter/receiver antennas, circuitry andports, as well as the encoding/decoding capabilities that may benecessary for proper transmission and/or reception of data and otherinformation. The exemplary device 1000 that is depicted in FIG. 10 maybe integrated into as part of a content handling device 100, a masterdevice 404, a slave device 412, a delegating device 504, a delegateddevice 510 and/or a destination device 514 that are depicted in FIGS. 1,4 and 5.

Referring back to FIG. 1, any one of the watermark extractor 104, thedigital signature generator 106, the encryption component 108, theauthentication component 120 and the like may be implemented insoftware, hardware, firmware, or combinations thereof. Similarly, thevarious components or sub-components within each module may beimplemented in software, hardware or firmware. The connectivity betweenthe modules and/or components within the modules may be provided usingany one of the connectivity methods and media that is known in the art,including, but not limited to, communications over the Internet, wired,or wireless networks using the appropriate protocols.

Various embodiments described herein are described in the generalcontext of methods or processes, which may be implemented in oneembodiment by a computer program product, embodied in acomputer-readable medium, including computer-executable instructions,such as program code, executed by computers in networked environments. Acomputer-readable medium may include removable and non-removable storagedevices including, but not limited to, Read Only Memory (ROM), RandomAccess Memory (RAM), compact discs (CDs), digital versatile discs (DVD),etc. Therefore, the computer-readable media that is described in thepresent application comprises non-transitory storage media. Generally,program modules may include routines, programs, objects, components,data structures, etc. that perform particular tasks or implementparticular abstract data types. Computer-executable instructions,associated data structures, and program modules represent examples ofprogram code for executing steps of the methods disclosed herein. Theparticular sequence of such executable instructions or associated datastructures represents examples of corresponding acts for implementingthe functions described in such steps or processes.

The foregoing description of embodiments has been presented for purposesof illustration and description. The foregoing description is notintended to be exhaustive or to limit embodiments of the presentinvention to the precise form disclosed, and modifications andvariations are possible in light of the above teachings or may beacquired from practice of various embodiments. The embodiments discussedherein were chosen and described in order to explain the principles andthe nature of various embodiments and its practical application toenable one skilled in the art to utilize the present invention invarious embodiments and with various modifications as are suited to theparticular use contemplated. The features of the embodiments describedherein may be combined in all possible combinations of methods,apparatus, modules, systems, and computer program products.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method for conducting cooperative contentmanagement operations using two or more devices in a networkedenvironment, the method comprising: receiving a request for access to acontent at a first device from a second device, the first device, thesecond device, and at least one of a trusted delegated device or atrusted slave device residing in the networked environment; performingdevice authentication to ascertain a trusted status associated with oneor both of the first and second devices; ascertaining capabilities ofthe second device to conduct one or both of watermark extraction orcontent screening operations; and based on at least the ascertainedcapabilities of the second device and trusted status of the first or thesecond devices, determining an operational configuration for conductingcooperative content management operations by designating one of thefirst device, the second device, the trusted delegated device or thetrusted slave device to conduct watermark extraction operations anddesignating one of the first device, the second device or the trusteddelegated device to conduct content screening operations, wherein: thewatermark extraction operations exclude the content screening operationsand include examination of the content to determine a presence or avalue of a watermark embedded in the content, the content screeningoperations exclude the watermark extraction operations and includedetermining, based at least on a result of the watermark extractionoperations, whether or not the request to access the content conforms toa content use policy prior to allowing or denying access to the content,the trusted delegated device is a device in the networked environmentthat is invoked by a delegating device within the networked environmentand is capable of conducting one or both of the watermark screening orthe content screening operations and deciding whether or not to presentthe content to another device in the networked environment based atleast on a result of the content screening operations, and the trustedslave device is a device in the networked environment that is invoked bya master device within the networked environment to conduct thewatermark extraction operations and provide a result of the watermarkextraction operations to the master device.
 2. The method of claim 1,further comprising: based on the determined operational configuration,selecting the trusted slave device to perform the watermark extractionoperations, and selecting the second device to perform the contentscreening operations, and wherein the second device is a trusted contentclient device.
 3. The method of claim 1, further comprising: based onthe determined operational configuration, selecting the trusted slavedevice to perform the watermark extraction operations, and selecting thefirst device to perform the content screening operations.
 4. The methodof claim 1, further comprising: based on the determined operationalconfiguration, selecting the trusted delegated device to perform thewatermark extraction and screening operations, wherein the first deviceis a trusted content server that operates as the delegating device. 5.The method of claim 1, further comprising: based on the determinedoperational configuration, selecting the first device to perform thewatermark extraction operations, and selecting the second device isconfigured to perform the content screening operations, wherein: thefirst device is a trusted content server; the second device is a trustedcontent client device.
 6. The method of claim 1, further comprising:based on the determined operational configuration, selecting the seconddevice to perform the watermark extraction operations, and selecting thefirst device to perform the content screening operations, wherein: thefirst device is a trusted content server; the second device is a trustedcontent client device.
 7. The method of claim 1, wherein performingdevice authentication comprises: receiving a device authenticationcertificate at the first device from the second device, and verifying anauthenticity of the certificate.
 8. The method of claim 7, wherein thedevice authentication certificate comprises information indicative of atleast a portion of the capabilities of the second device.
 9. The methodof claim 8, wherein: the device authentication certificate is a digitaltransmission content protection over Internet protocol (DTCP-IP)certificate; and information regarding the capabilities of the seconddevice is carried as part of the DCTP-IP certificate.
 10. The method ofclaim 7, wherein the ascertained capabilities of the second devicecomprises a capability to grant computational and memory resources toother devices.
 11. The method of claim 1, further comprising: selectingone of the first, the second device, the trusted delegated device or thetrusted slave device to conduct the watermark extraction operations andselecting one of the first device, the second device or the trusteddelegated device to conduct content screening operations based on afactor selected from the group consisting of: availability ofcomputational resources; availability of watermark extraction andscreening capabilities; an integration for a device manufacture; aconsumer experience; a processing performance; and an overall preferenceranking.
 12. The method of claim 1 comprising wherein the request foraccess to the content is initially received at a gateway deviceconfigured to: coordinate device authentication to ascertain a trustedstatus associated with one or both of the first and second devices; anddetermine the operational configuration; and select one or more of thefirst device, the second device, the trusted delegated device and thetrusted slave device to perform the watermark extraction operations andselect one or more of the first device, the second device or the trusteddelegated device to perform the content screening operations.
 13. Themethod of claim 12, wherein the gateway device is configured tocommunicate with the one or more of the first device, the second device,the trusted delegated device or the trusted slave device to commence thewatermark extraction and/or content screening operations.
 14. The methodof claim 12, wherein the gateway device is configured to revoke atrusted status of a device within the network.
 15. The method of claim12, wherein the gateway device is configured to retain the content usepolicy associated with embedded watermarks.
 16. A device, comprising: aprocessor; and a memory, including processor executable code, theprocessor executable code when executed by the processor configures thedevice to: receive a request for access to a content at a first devicefrom a second device, the first device, the second device, and at leastone of a trusted delegated device or a trusted slave device residing ina networked environment; perform device authentication to ascertain atrusted status associated with one or both of the first and the seconddevices using a device authentication certificate; ascertaincapabilities of the second device to conduct one or both of watermarkextraction or content screening operations; based on at least theascertained capabilities of the second device and trusted status of thefirst or the second devices, determine an operational configuration forconducting cooperative content management operations by designating oneof the first device, the second device, the trusted delegated device orthe trusted slave device to conduct watermark extraction operations anddesignating one of the first device, the second device or the trusteddelegated device to conduct content screening operations, wherein: thewatermark extraction operations exclude the content screening operationsand include examination of the content to determine a presence or avalue of a watermark embedded in the content, the content screeningoperations exclude the watermark extraction operations and includedetermining, based at least on a result of the watermark extractionoperations, whether or not the request to access the content conforms toa content use policy prior to allowing or denying access to the content,the trusted delegated device is a device in the networked environmentthat is invoked by a delegating device within the networked environmentand is capable of conducting one or both of the watermark screening orthe content screening operations and deciding whether or not to presentthe content to another device in the networked environment based atleast on a result of the content screening operations, and the trustedslave device is a device in the networked environment that is invoked bya master device within the networked environment to conduct thewatermark extraction operations and provide a result of the watermarkextraction operations to the master device.
 17. The device of claim 16,wherein: the device authentication certificate comprises informationindicative of at least a portion of the capabilities of the seconddevice.
 18. The device of claim 16, wherein: the device authenticationcertificate is a digital transmission content protection over Internetprotocol (DTCP-IP) certificate; and information regarding thecapabilities of the second device is carried as part of the DCTP-IPcertificate.
 19. The device of claim 16, wherein the ascertainedcapabilities of the second device comprises a capability to grantcomputational and memory resources to other devices.